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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: 
 
I am pleased to testify today about credit cards and bankruptcy.  The credit card is 
one of the great innovations in the American consumer economy in the 20th century. 
Credit cards are, in many respects, an excellent product.  Credit cards supply consumers 
with both an extremely convenient payment method and an easy source of financing.  
Credit cards are the dominant method of consumer financing for everyday purchases.  
 Credit cards, however, are also a product that can misused by both consumers and 
card issuers.  Consumers can use card irresponsibly, and banks can issue cards and extend 
credit limits irresponsibly.  Unfortunately, credit card business models and product 
design encourage unsustainable and irresponsible lending that leaves consumers mired in 
debt and which hurts responsible creditors like small businesses, landlords, tort victims, 
and the government.  The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) promotes these predatory business models and product designs, and I 
urge the Congress to consider repealing key parts of the BAPCPA.  I also urge the 
Congress to consider more comprehensive credit card reform that includes 
standardization of cardholder agreements and simplification of credit card price 
structures.   
 I wish to make four main points in my testimony today:   
 (1) Credit card debt is a major factor in consumer financial distress and 
bankruptcy.   
 (2) Credit card product design and business models are an important factor in high 
levels of card debt.   
 (3) The BAPCPA encourages credit card product design that fosters unsustainable 
credit card lending at the expense of consumers and responsible creditors.   
 (4) A comprehensive approach should be taken to credit card reform legislation, 
and part of that approach should be the standardization of cardholder agreement terms 
and the simplification of credit card pricing.  Simplified pricing and standardized terms 
will allow disclosure to function and make a safer, fairer, and more transparent card 
market. 
I.  CREDIT CARD DEBT IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 Credit card debt is a major factor in consumer financial distress.  Data on credit 
card use and financial distress is limited, but an examination of credit card debt and 
bankruptcy filings shows that consumer bankruptcy filers are mired in credit card debt.  
87% of consumer bankruptcy filers have credit card debt at their time of filing.1  In 2007, 
the median consumer bankruptcy filer with credit card debt had $16,576.00 in credit card 
                                            
1 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project.  The numbers reported in this testimony are slightly lower 
than those reported ($17,513.00) in testimony I presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts on a March 24, 2009 hearing.  The 2007 CBP 
oversamples elderly Americans.  This testimony presents figures that have been corrected for that 
oversampling.  
debt.2  This accounted for 18% of the median consumer bankruptcy filer’s total debt and 
47% of the median consumer’s unsecured debt (including taxes, rent, alimony, utilities, 
medical bills, and student loans).3  Credit card debt is, after mortgage debt, the largest 
single obligation of most consumer bankruptcy filers.4   
 To provide some perspective on what $16,576 in card debt means for the median 
bankruptcy filer, it is 60% of the gross, pre-tax household income of the median filer with 
card debt.5  Consumer bankruptcy filers earn less than the median American household, 
but the $16,576 is still over 35% of the median gross annual national income.6  The 
relative severity of credit card debt burdens of bankruptcy filers is evident from Chart 1, 
which shows levels of credit card debt and gross annual income for the median American 
household and the median consumer bankruptcy filer in 2007.  
Chart 1. Gross Annual Income and Credit Card Debt 
 
 It is not clear how much of consumer bankruptcy filers’ credit card debt is 
purchase balances and how much is accrued interest and fees, but if a consumer with 
$16,576 in credit card debt at an APR of 18%, made no more purchases, incurred no fees, 
                                            
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. (median annualized gross monthly income of $26,982.00). 
6 Brian K. Bucks, et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A1, A5 (2009), at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/scf09.pdf (reporting national median income of 
$47,300.00).   
and paid off the debt in five years, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency’s 
recommended amortization period for credit card debt, the consumer would have to make 
monthly payments of $420.92.  These payments would be 18% of the median consumer 
debtor with credit card debt’s gross (pre-tax) monthly income, and 11% of the national 
median gross (pre-tax) monthly income.  For a middle- or lower- income consumer who 
also to pay taxes and provide basic necessities of food and shelter for her family, this sort 
of debt burden is near impossible.  Few consumers can service high interest rates like 
credit card default rates from their disposable income, let alone make any headway in 
paying down the principal.  Not surprisingly, 52% of consumer bankruptcy filers list 
credit card debt as a major factor in their bankruptcy. 7 
 The precise dynamics of credit card debt and financial distress are not well 
understood.  While Professor Ronald Mann has shown that dollar for dollar, a consumer 
with credit card debt is more likely to file for bankruptcy than a consumer with any other 
form of debt,8 it is not clear whether card debt generate financial distress in the first 
instance or whether consumers in financial distress turn to cards as a source of short-term 
financing.  In either case, however, credit card debt certainly contributes to financial 
distress as the interest and fees on card debt amounts faster than consumers can pay it off.  
Credit cards amplify existing debt burdens, and for many families this means credit cards 
are financial quicksand. 
 There are several factors underlying high levels of credit card debt: the 
macroeconomic strain of the American family; irresponsible spending; and credit card 
product design.  High levels of credit card debt reflect the deeper economic problems of 
American families:  the costs of health care, education, and housing. 9 These basic costs 
of living have increased dramatically in recent decades, while incomes have remained 
stagnant.  Savings rates have plummeted to zero or even negative, and home equity, the 
largest single asset of many families, has been depleted.  Household finances have been 
stretched thin by increased costs of living and stagnant incomes.  This means there is no 
cushion left for middle class families faced with unpredictable shocks to their income like 
death, illness, divorce, or unemployment.  Many American families are forced to finance 
basic expenses off of cards in order to maintain the same middle class standard of living.  
To be sure, there are some individuals who borrow lavishly and irresponsibly on their 
credit cards to support a lifestyle far beyond their means, but these are the exception, not 
the rule; macroeconomic pressures on the American family are the primary driver of card 
debt.   
                                            
7 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project Database. 
8 RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD:  THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD 
MARKETS (2006).   
9 ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN-TYALGI, TWO-INCOME TRAP:  WHY MIDDLE-CLASS 
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 180 (Basic 2003).  It is also important to note that but for the 
mortgage bubble, Americans would like be mired far more deeply in credit card debt.  During the mortgage 
bubble, many households did cash-out refinancings of their mortgages and used the cashed-out home equity 
to pay down credit card debt.  At the time, with a rising housing market this seemed quite sensible.  For 
example, a household might have paid off $20,000 in credit card debt at 20% APR by refinancing it into a 
9% APR mortgage.  The mortgage bubble thus eased credit card debt burdens.  Now that the bubble has 
popped and the home equity piggybank is empty, hard stretched American families are again turning to 
credit cards to finance daily expenses. 
 Card debt is the Scotch tape holding together the middle class.  Unfortunately, for 
many families, it also exacerbates their financial distress.  Simply servicing credit card 
debt is a major strain for American families.  As Chart 2 shows, even in inflation adjusted 
dollars, the amount of interest US households pay on revolving debt (almost all of which 
is credit card debt), has grown significantly and is now at over $2,000/year, or over 4% of 
gross annual median income.  These high levels of credit card debt also discourage 
savings for future contingencies and retirement.   
Chart 2.   Interest Paid on Revolving Debt Per Household 
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Products 
Accounts, Table. 2.1.1, Line 29. 
 
II.  CREDIT CARD PRODUCT DESIGN AND BUSINESS MODEL FOSTER HIGH LEVELS OF 
CARD DEBT 
 While credit card debt burdens are in part a function of the macroeconomic 
problems of the American family, they are also a function of credit card product design.  
Credit card product design makes it possible to lend profitably even to high risk 
consumers.  A traditional creditor lends money with an eye to recovering its principal and 
making a profit from the interest.  Such a lender cannot lend to overly risky customers, as 
loss of principal is devastating to its business model.  As a result, a traditional lender will 
engage in robust underwriting of its loans.   
Credit card issuers hardly engage in robust underwriting; credit cards are almost 
all stated income loans, which have come to be better known as “liar loans,” in the 
mortgage context.  While card issuers will look at credit scores and credit reporting 
information, this is extremely thin as underwriting goes—there is no validated 
information on income and assets or non-credit-reported debts.   
A.  The Sweatbox Lending Model 
Card issuers are able to engage in unsecured stated-income lending because many 
employ a non-traditional lending strategy, one that Professor Ronald Mann of Columbia 
Law School has termed “the sweatbox.”  Sweatbox lending does not require return of the 
principal.  Instead, the sweatbox lender makes enough money off of interest and fees that 
even if it losses the principal, it will still make a handsome profit.10  Thus, a sweatbox 
lender will be willing to make loans that are unsustainable in the long run, so long as it 
can extract sufficient profit before the consumer defaults.  As explained by Julie L. 
Williams, then the Acting Comptroller of the Currency, “Today the focus for lenders is 
not so much on consumer loans being repaid, but on the loan as a perpetual earning 
asset…it’s not repayment of the amount of the debt that is the focus, but rather the 
income the credit relationship generates through periodic payments on the loan, 
associated fees, and cross-selling opportunities.”11   
Credit card price structures are a key part of the sweatbox model.  Credit cards not 
only have high interest rates, but they have extremely high back-end fees that are 
unrelated to costs, such as late fees and overlimit fees, plus a host of billing tricks and 
traps that function as hidden price points.  Tricks and traps directly generated over $12 
billion in revenue for the card industry in 2007,12 which was over 30% of the industry’s 
pre-tax profits.13  By shifting the cost of credit away from prominent, up-front price 
points like purchase APR to back-end fees and penalty APRs and billing tricks and traps, 
card issuers encourage greater use of cards, thereby increasing the number of consumers 
who enter the sweatbox.   
B.  Interchange Fees 
Several other features of credit card product design also encourage riskier lending. 
Increasingly, the card industry’s business model is fee-based, not interest based.  
Unfortunately, just as with subprime mortgages, the fee-based business model creates a 
perverse incentive to lend indiscriminately and ignore delinquencies.   
Card issuers make money on every credit card transaction, regardless of whether 
the consumer ultimately pays a finance charge.  The issuer receives around two percent 
of every transaction in a fee paid by the merchant (and passed on to all consumers in the 
                                            
10 See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 375, 392-97 (2007). 
11 Remarks by Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Before the BAI National 
Loan Review Conference, New Orleans, LA, March 21, 2005, at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-34a.pdf. 
12 Comment Letter 177, Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (2008-0004), from Oliver Ireland, 
Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP, dated August 7, 2008, available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/comments/bdc5cc5c-1e0b-8562-eb23-ff7159e49505.pdf.  The letter does not 
address on whose behalf Mr. Ireland is writing, but Mr. Ireland is a prominent credit card industry 
lobbyist.. 
13 CardData.com (subscription data source).  
form of higher prices), called the interchange fee.14  Card issuers will collect about $48 
billion in interchange fees this year.15   
Because interchange is based on transaction volume, it creates an incentive for 
banks to issue as many cards as possible, with little regard to the creditworthiness of the 
borrower.  By creating a huge revenue stream unrelated to credit risk, interchange 
encourages card issuers to engage in less careful underwriting. 
C.  Securitization 
Banks have compounded this problem by shifting much of the loan risk to 
investors through securitization.  When card issuers securitize credit card debt, they 
transform the credit card debt into a pool of assets used to pay off bonds.  If the pool 
turns out not to be large enough, the bond investors take the loss.  But if there’s a surplus, 
it goes to the card issuer.   
To illustrate, credit card securitization deals typically require that the card issuer 
retain an untranched 7% stake in the securitized pool.   Many issuers will keep a higher 
stake.  Suppose an issue has a 15% stake in a pool and the pool needs to pay $100 million 
in bonds.  If the pool generates revenue of $110 million, the card issuer gets $25 million 
($10 million in excess spread + 15% of $100 million).  If the pool only generates $90 
million in revenue, however, the card issuer losses only $1.5 million (15% of $10 million 
in losses). 
Because the card issuer retains control of the terms of securitized accounts, it can 
easily increase their volatility by applying and increasing penalty interest rates and fees.  
Some consumers will default as a result of higher rates and fees, but others will simply 
pay more.  Because the card issuer has all of the upside and only a fraction of the 
downside, there is an incentive for the card issuer to crank up the interest rates and fees.  
For example, if a card issuer normally has a 5% default rate for an average balance of 
$100, it can expect revenue of $95.  If the card issuer raises interest and fees so that 
average balances go up to $110, even if default rates go up two and a half times to 12.5%.   
While card issuers sell off most of the default risk, they keep any upside that 
comes from inflating their fees and rates.  If the higher fees and rates cause more defaults, 
it is investors who bear the loss.  If the higher fees result in more income, however, it is 
the card issuer, not the investors, who benefit.  Credit card securitization creates a heads I 
win, tails you lose situation and leads the banks to increase fees and interest rates on 
securitized debt.  Interchange and securitization thus make it possible for card issuers to 
engage in less careful underwriting, which allows them to apply the sweatbox to even 
more consumers, including ones who are less economically stable.   
D.  Sweatbox Lending and Bankruptcy “Reform” 
All lenders lend for profit, of course, but a lender who lends with an eye to getting 
its principal repaid and making a profit from the interest is a very different type of lender 
than one who lends with an eye to turning the consumer into a “perpetual earning asset.”  
                                            
14 Technically, the interchange fee is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the issuer, but this fee 
is simply passed along to the merchant as is the bulk of the “merchant discount fee.”  See Levitin, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined..   
15 Merchants Payments Coalition. 
No matter how greedy a lender is, a lender that is looking to get back its principal, cannot 
squeeze a consumer too hard lest it push the consumer into default.  A lender that doesn’t 
care about getting principal repaid, as much as about extracting maximum payments from 
the consumer will squeeze much harder.  This business model resulted in things like the 
“interest only” and “pay option ARM” mortgages that are currently wreaking havoc on 
the economic.  It is an inherently reckless business model because even if lenders do not 
want consumers to default, they lack sufficient information to make sure that they do not 
end up pushing the consumer into default.  The sweatbox lending model is predatory and 
unsuited for sustainable lending. 
 There are two keys to making the sweatbox lending model work.  First, the “heat” 
must be high enough—interest rates and fees must be lathered on.  Card issuers have 
shown that they are expert at this.  And second, the consumer must be kept in the 
sweatbox as long as possible.  As Professor Mann has observed, the longer the consumer 
can be kept in the sweatbox of making minimum payments that exceed the cost of funds 
before eventually defaulting, the more profitable the loan.  Bankruptcy is an escape hatch 
from the sweatbox.  Thus, anything the lender can do to delay the default, such as making 
it more difficult to file for bankruptcy, allows the lender to extract greater revenue from 
the consumer.   
 The aim of keeping consumers in a lending sweatbox for as long as possible 
explains key parts of the BAPCPA, in particular the means test and credit counseling 
requirements.   
III.  THE BAPCPA BENEFITS CREDIT CARD ISSUERS AT THE EXPENSE OF DEBTORS 
AND OTHER CREDITORS 
The centerpiece of the BAPCPA was the “means test” that determines which 
consumers are eligible for filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  The means test is a rubric for 
a complex statutory provision regarding whether a rebuttable presumption of abuse exists 
for a consumer debtor to file for Chapter 7 and who can raise the presumption. If a 
consumer bankruptcy filer’s adjusted income is too high, then a presumption of abuse 
exists against the consumer.  If the debtor’s filing is found to be an abuse of Chapter 7’s 
provisions, then the case must be dismissed or converted to Chapter 13 or 11.   
Whatever one thinks about means testing as a general policy matter, there is broad 
consensus that the current means test is poorly drafted and ineffective.  There has been no 
noticeable impact on the income of consumers filing for bankruptcy before or after the 
2005 amendments; the median income and the distribution of income of bankruptcy filers 
in 2001 was virtually identical to filers in 2007.16 As the most recent empirical study of 
the impact of BAPCPA on bankruptcy filings notes, “instead of functioning like a sieve, 
carefully sorting the high-income abusers from those in true need, the amendments’ 
means test functioned more like a barricade, blocking out hundreds of thousands of 
struggling families indiscriminately, regardless of their individual income 
                                            
16 Robert M. Lawless, et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?  An Empirical Study of Consumer 
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 358-63 (2008). 
circumstances.”17 This is not what the bill was marketed as doing.  It “was not the 
Bankruptcy Numbers Reduction Act; it was the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act.”18 
The credit card industry’s goal with the 2005 amendments, however, was not to 
sort out can-pay debtors or to extract greater payouts in bankruptcy.  Instead, the card 
industry sought to delay bankruptcy filings.  Delayed bankruptcy filings boost credit card 
industry profits.  The 2005 amendments, in particular the documentation required for 
means testing and the requirement of pre-bankruptcy credit counseling, add delay directly 
to the filing process.  They also encourage delay for debtors who wish to avoid the abuse 
presumption of the means test; it is relatively easy for a debtor to game the means test, 
but to do so requires delaying a filing by some months.  And the 2005 amendments add 
cost to the filing process, and cost adds further delay, as many consumers file for 
bankruptcy not because of an exigent need, like to prevent a mortgage foreclosure, but 
when they have saved up enough money to file.   
 Because bankruptcy distributions on unsecured debt are made pro rata, delayed 
filings benefits creditors, like credit card issuers, with higher interest rates.  Their claims 
grow relatively faster than unsecured creditors who charge no or low rates of interest, 
such as tort claimants, medical bills, landlords, local merchants and small businesses, and 
federal, state, and local government.  Because distributions on unsecured debt are made 
pro rata, it is a zero sum game; to the extent that card issuers’ claims are larger because of 
delay it comes at the expense of other creditors.   
This can be seen when one compares pre-BAPCPA debt burdens of bankruptcy 
filers to post-BAPCPA debt burdens.  From 2001 to 2007, median secured debt rose 
20.8% and median unsecured debt (primarily credit cards) rose 43.6%.19  Delayed filings 
only leave debtors more deeply mired in debt (not all of which is dischargeable, thus 
limiting the potency of the bankruptcy “fresh start”), and may delay filings past the 
prudent point.  The delay comes at the expense of creditors who charge more manageable 
rates of interest.  And means testing adds a significant burden to the court system.  
Whatever one thinks of the policy of means testing and related measures supposedly 
designed to prevent bankruptcy “abuse,” they have been unsuccessful on their own terms; 
BAPCPA has delayed and kept down bankruptcy filings in general, rather than screened 
out abusers.20  The abuse prevention measures in BAPCPA were also unnecessary; the 
Bankruptcy Code already gave creditors the ability to challenge debtors’ discharges,21 but 
credit card issuers rarely litigated under these provisions.   
Eliminating the means test and credit counseling requirements for bankruptcy 
filers would make it cheaper and simpler to file for bankruptcy and would discourage 
card issuers from sweatbox lending that pushes many consumers into bankruptcy and 
exacerbates the economic problems of the already-stretched American family. 
 
 
                                            
17 Id. at 353. 
18 Id. at 352. 
19 Id. at 368. 
20 Id. at 352. 
21 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). 
IV.  SUGGESTIONS FOR CREDIT CARD REFORM LEGISLATION 
A.  The Need for Comprehensive Card Reform Legislation 
Credit cards play an important role in the American economy, but they also cause 
significant problems and exacerbate others.  The current financial crisis underscores the 
important of consumer protection for the health of the entire economy, and the Congress 
has rightly taken a keen interest in credit card reform legislation.  The credit card reform 
legislation that has been proposed, however, takes a piecemeal approach.  There are bills 
that deal with billing practices, with bankruptcy, with interchange, with usury, and with 
establishing a federal financial product safety commission.  These are all important 
issues, but they are also intertwined.  Therefore, I urge Congress to consider taking a 
comprehensive approach to credit card reform legislation.  Issues like bankruptcy, billing 
practices, interchange, securitization, and usury are all intimately linked, and would be 
best addressed comprehensively, rather than piecemeal.   
B.  Limitations with Current Approaches to Credit Card Regulation  
I would also urge the Congress to recognize that the there are significant 
drawbacks to the two primary methods of card regulation used to date:  disclosure 
regulations and substantive regulations.   
1.  Disclosure Regulation 
Disclosure has been the primary paradigm for card regulation since the 1968 
Truth-in-Lending Act.  Unfortunately, there is no evidence that it works for complex 
financial products like credit cards.  While disclosure is effective for simple financial 
products where consumers can compare one or a few price terms, it cannot work for 
credit cards. Credit cards are different from virtually every other consumer financial 
product in their complexity.  Most consumer credit products, such as auto loans, 
mortgages, and student loans have only one or two price points.  These price points do 
not vary except in relation to an objective index, such as the Federal Funds Rate or 
LIBOR.  Unlike other common consumer credit products, however, credit cards have an 
astounding array of price points:  annual fees, merchant fees, teaser interest rates, base 
interest rates, balance transfer interest rates, cash advance interest rates, overdraft 
advance interest rates, default interest rates, late fees, overlimit fees, balance transfer 
fees, cash advance fees, international transaction fees, telephone payment fees, etc.  
These are all explicit prices points, disclosed in Truth-in-Lending schedules.   
The sheer number of explicit prices points that make it difficult for consumers to 
accurately and easily gauge the total cost of using credit cards.22  Consumers are not 
capable of doing the on-the-spot calculations necessary to figure out whether or not to use 
any particular credit card for any particular transaction.  There is too much information 
that the consumer must process.  Even if the consumer could process all this information, 
it simply would not be worthwhile to do for every transaction.   The burden this would 
impose would negate all of the convenience benefits credit cards have for consumers.   
                                            
22 Mark Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure, Discussion Paper, 
Payment Cards Center, Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Jan. 2003, at 19. 
Consumers’ difficulty in determining the cost of credit cards is compounded by 
credit cards’ hidden price points in the form of billing practices, such as universal cross-
default, unilateral term changes, residual interest, two-cycle billing, unlimited overlimit 
fees, application of payments to the lowest interest rate balance, non-standard use of 
terms like “fixed rate” and “Prime rate,” and unclear policies as to precisely when a 
payment is due.  These billing practices make credit card pricing to vary based not only 
on objective indices, but also on the card issuers’ subjective whim.  Credit card billing 
practices alter the application of the explicit price points and make the effective cost of 
using credit cards higher than disclosed.  These billing practices further obfuscate the true 
cost of using credit and make it virtually impossible for a consumer to make a fully 
informed decision about whether to use credit and, if so, which credit card product to use.   
2.  Substantive Regulation 
Substantive regulations, like usury laws and unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices (UDAP) statutes are able to address specific egregious card industry practices.  
Strong substantive regulations can have the unintended consequences of product 
substitute and credit rationing.  But even more limited substantive regulation can result in 
term substitution:  card issuers will simply substitute new terms for the regulated ones.  
Thus, legislating against specific practices inevitably devolve into a game of regulatory 
Whac-A-Mole:  every time regulators put the kibosh on one practice, the card industry 
invents another to take its place.  The card industry has shown itself to be remarkably 
resourceful in engineering its products around regulation.  Congress will always be 
playing catch-up in this game of regulation and innovation.  A dedicated federal 
regulatory agency, like a consumer financial product safety commission would be able to 
move faster than Congress, but even then it might not move fast enough.   
C.  A New Approach to Card Regulation:  Standardization and Simplification 
The only sure way to stop negative innovation in the card industry is to flip the 
regulatory model on its head.  Currently card issuers are allowed to do anything, except 
specific prohibited practices.  The better regulatory structure would be to prohibit 
anything, except for specific permitted practices.  Such a regulatory model could be 
combined with a mandatory simplification of credit card price structures.  All of credit 
cards’ myriad price points can be boiled down into three price terms:  an availability fee, 
a transaction fee, and an interest rate.  Congress would do well to mandate that these and 
only these three fees may be charged by card issuers, and to require standardization of 
key cardholder agreement terms, just as is currently done with insurance policies.  Card 
issuers would be free to compete and price as they wish within this focused structure.   
The benefits of mandating standardization and simplification of credit card price 
structures are that consumers would be able to easily and simply compare cards on an 
“apples-to-apples” basis that would give them the entire picture of the costs involved 
with a card.  There would be no worries about the fine print and no hidden fees or price 
points designed to take advantage of consumers’ tendency to overestimate their future 
ability to repay and underestimate the costs of delayed fees and interest.  
While standardization would come at the price of some product differentiation, 
the variation among credit cards currently is insignificant—consider Capital One’s 
present advertising campaign, which touts the special feature of Capital One’s cards:  that 
a cardholder can choose the picture that goes on the card.  Instead, what one would 
expect to emerge would be a (much-needed) bifurcation to occur in the card market.  
There should emerge a market for cards aimed at transactors and another aimed at 
revolvers.  Those aimed at transactors, would feature high interest rates, but low per 
transaction fees, while those cards aimed at revolvers would have higher transaction fees, 
but lower interest rates.   
None of this would solve the problem of consumers’ inability to accurately 
predict whether they would revolve or merely transact, and many consumers alternate 
between the two.  But by simplifying card pricing structure, consumers would be able to 
at least pick the lowest cost card in either category, and this would push down interest 
rates (and eliminate back-end fees).  Without inefficiently high interest rates and back-
end fees, the sweatbox lending model cannot work, and the card industry would have to 
go back to safer, more sustainable, and non-predatory traditional lending models.  
I urge the Congress to take up a comprehensive program of credit card reform 
legislation.  While repealing parts of the BAPCPA is a key element to creating a fair and 
sustainable card lending industry, that alone will not eliminate predatory lending models.  
Instead, I strongly urge the Congress to consider mandating term standardization and 
price structure simplification for credit cards.   
